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The presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical im-
pact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically
superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small
amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible.
The criterion for the viability of a standard is that the sum of \support
ratios" of all players must be smaller than one, where \support ratio"
is dened as the ratio of the rm's per-period cost of supporting the
standard to the per-period gross benet that the rm receives after
all players comply with the standard.
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11 Introduction
When a rm invests in Supply Chain Management (SCM) software, it hopes
that by the time the system is deployed, its supply chain partners will have
already deployed their SCM software. In a perfect world, all partners would
pick a single date for their systems to go online, and it would be individu-
ally optimal for each rm to follow that schedule. In reality, however, even
trains do not always come on time, and it is impossible to perfectly anticipate
the exact time of SCM deployment|some rms will necessarily be later than
others. When an individual rm schedules SCM software deployment, it does
not take into account the expected negative externality of postponing its in-
vestment. Thus, deployment may happen ineciently late or, if externalities
are suciently large, never.
This problem arises whenever rms schedule complementary projects or
investments. For another example, consider Bluetooth. Bluetooth is a tech-
nological standard that enables \wireless links between mobile computers,
mobile phones, portable handheld devices, and connectivity to the Inter-
net."1 To take advantage of this technology, a rm needs to install a radio
chip in its hardware, and write software integrating the chip with the rest of
the system. This will be protable only if by the time the design and man-
ufacture of these products are complete, there are other Bluetooth-enabled
devices from other rms to communicate with.
1http://www.bluetooth.com/
2In this paper we study such synchronization issues, when rms want to
make complementary business decisions which need advance planning. To
focus our attention, we talk about the adoption of standards, but the in-
sights are applicable in a broader context, from investments in complemen-
tary technologies to large-scale real estate development. We show that adding
a stochastic component (noise) to adoption times may have a critical impact
on the viability of a standard. Perhaps surprisingly, in a wide range of cases,
a universally desired standard may not be viable in a sense that any amount
of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. As a result,
given several alternatives, market participants may forgo a technically su-
perior (Pareto dominant) standard in favor of an inferior one, if the former
is not viable. Propositions 1 and 5 show that the viability of a standard
depends only on \support ratios," where \support ratio" is dened as the
ratio of the rm's per-period cost of supporting the standard to the per-
period gross benet that the rm receives when other rms comply with the
standard.
Let us sketch a two-player example that illustrates the model considered
herein. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two possible standards:
the status quo and the new standard that Pareto dominates the status quo.
Both rms simultaneously choose target dates for compliance with the new
standard. The actual compliance time is uncertain, it is equal to the target
time plus noise. As soon as a rm is compliant with the standard, it incurs
3a per-period cost of supporting the standard, c.2 Complying with the new
standard starts paying o only after the standard is adopted by both rms.
When (and if) this happens, each rm starts receiving a stream of net benets
at the rate d (i.e. the gross per-period benet is c + d).
Without noise in compliance times, the game has a continuum of pure
strategy equilibria: any adoption time is an equilibrium as long as both
players choose that time to comply with the standard.3 Proposition 1 shows
that this multiplicity of equilibria is a knife-edge result. If there is noise
in adoption times, at most two equilibria survive. There is always a trivial
equilibrium where neither player ever adopts the new standard. The equilib-
rium where the new standard is adopted may or may not exist. Proposition
1 also establishes a necessary condition for the viability of a standard. This
condition becomes necessary and sucient as the players' discount rate con-
verges to one. Coordination on the new standard is impossible if the cost
of maintaining it is more than half the gross benet that a standard yields
after adoption by both players. In other words, a standard is not viable if its
support ratio, c
c+d, is greater than one half. This is true for any distribution
of noise in the disturbance terms.
2The cost of supporting a standard may take many forms. For example, hardware man-
ufacturers who were rst to put Bluetooth communication technology into their products
incurred a waiting cost, because including a Bluetooth chip increases the manufacturing
cost and adds no value for customers unless other Bluetooth-equipped devices are avail-
able. In other situations, early adopters may incur inventory costs. All else being equal,
a rm would prefer to invest later rather than sooner due to time value of money.
3We are assuming that the new standard is Pareto dominant if when adopted it yields
a positive net benet for all players.
4Let us sketch the intuition behind this result. First, observe that the best
outcome for both players is simultaneous adoption. From the ex-post per-
spective, a player who complies rst \wishes" he had targeted a slightly later
compliance time, since that would have saved him c per period. Similarly, a
player who complies last wishes he had targeted a slightly earlier compliance
time because that would have saved him the gross benet from the stan-
dard minus the cost of maintaining the standard (which is exactly equal to
c for a \borderline viable" standard). Thus, roughly speaking, a standard
is not viable if the benet to the second adopter from lowering his target
compliance time is smaller than the cost to the rst adopter from lowering
his target compliance time. In this case, rst order conditions imply that
each player's best response is to try to be last with probability greater than
one half|consequently the equilibrium where the new standard is adopted
disappears.
The model of the standard adoption process presented in Section 3 is
highly stylized|players only get benets after everyone complies. It high-
lights the dramatic eects that an arbitrarily small amount of uncertainty
has on the equilibrium standard selection. In a deterministic world only
the net benets from a standard matter (the gross benets minus the costs
of supporting a standard); in this case the support ratio is irrelevant. If,
however, there is any amount of noise in compliance times, support ratios
become important. These eects do not go away in a more sophisticated
model where rms choose among several competing standards. Also, small
5amounts of noise continue to have a large impact on equilibrium selection
in models where network externalities gradually increase in the number of
adopters (See Section 6).4
2 Related Literature
The idea that adding noise to the model may reduce the set of equilibria has
a long history in economics. Recently, it gures prominently in the work on
global games, rst introduced in Carlsson and van Damme (1993). In global
games, agents receive noisy signals about the true economic fundamentals.
This captures the lack of common knowledge about the true state of the
economy (See Morris and Shin (2002) for the most recent survey of the global
games literature).5
The strand of the global games literature closest to our results is the work
on synchronization games with asynchronous clocks. This work was preceded
by a paper by Halpern and Moses (1990), who show that asynchronous clocks
may prevent synchronization because statements about timing never become
4It is worth mentioning that adding noise to other parameters of the model, such as
the agents' discount rate, costs of compliance with a standard and benets of standard
adoption, does not pin down the equilibrium of the model. That is why a model of standard
adoption should capture the uncertainty about compliance times and could neglect the
uncertainty about other parameters of the model.
5Some equilibrium renements are also based on the idea of perturbing a game.
Trembling-hand perfection is one example. However, there is a signicant dierence be-
tween the logic behind equilibrium renements and global games. Both this paper and
the global games literature attempt to consider games that capture some features of the
underlying economic reality that may play an important role in the selection of equilib-
rium. Unlike equilibrium renements, we do not seek to improve the equilibrium concept,
we seek to improve the model.
6common knowledge. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) show that a bubble
may persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs who learn about
the existence of the bubble at dierent times; essentially the diculty in
coordinating an attack on an asset is due to arbitrageurs' clocks not being
synchronized. Morris (1995) considers a synchronization problem faced by
agents who decide when to start working. Each worker knows the time on
his watch but watches are not perfectly synchronized. Morris shows that if
clocks are not perfectly synchronized coordination may not be achieved.
The setting of Morris's paper is very similar to ours|in both models
agents gain once everybody participates but \early arrival" is costly. How-
ever, Morris (1995) model is a global game, and the inability to coordinate
is due to agents having private information and thus lacking common knowl-
edge about timing. In contrast, in our model there is no issue of clock
synchronization, our agents have no private information, and the common
knowledge assumption is maintained. The diculty in coordination is due
to the inability to exactly control compliance times. Thus, our model is
not a global game. Nevertheless, our results share some of the remarkable
features often encountered in global games, namely (1) without noise there
is a continuum of equilibria, adding nose to the model pins the equilibrium
down; (2) there exists an equilibrium robust to noise.6 For the discussion of
the connection between the game considered herein and potential and global
6Loosely speaking, robustness to noise means that the same equilibria are pinned down
by a small amount of noise, regardless of the exact form of the noise.
7games see Appendix D.
Basu and Weibull (2002) also study synchronization, in the context of
social norms. In their model, an individual may choose to be \punctual"
or \tardy," and punctuality (or non-punctuality) may be just one of several
equilibria, rather than a society's innate trait.
Our results show that in a wide range of cases a technically superior
(Pareto dominant) standard may not be viable in a sense that any amount
of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. The failure of
a useful standard to get adopted is a common result in the standards litera-
ture. There are many possible reasons why this may happen or why an infe-
rior standard may prevail. They include ownership/sponsorship of standards,
current technical superiority and acceptance vs. future/long-term superior-
ity, and incompleteness of information (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986, 1994,
Farrell and Saloner 1985, Besen and Farrell 1994, Liebowitz and Margolis
1994).
On the other hand, this is the opposite of Farrell and Saloner (1985)
conclusion that if players make adoption decisions sequentially, \a somewhat
surprising result emerges: if all rms would benet from change [to a new
standard] then all will change" (p. 71). Farrell and Saloner point out that in
most cases players make adoption decisions simultaneously. In that case their
model has multiple equilibria. However, they show that it is an equilibrium
for players to switch to the Pareto dominant standard. This result hinges
on the assumption that the adoption of a new standard by a rm is an
8instantaneous process, and thus there are no costs of imperfect coordination
of adoption times. The result of Proposition 1 of our paper implies that
in a simultaneous-move game the Pareto ecient equilibrium considered in
Farrell and Saloner (1985) may disappear if any amount of uncertainty is
present. Thus, the predictions of sequential- and simultaneous-move models
are very dierent: the adoption of the Pareto dominant standard is the unique
equilibrium of the sequential-move game. In contrast, in a simultaneous-move
game the adoption of the Pareto dominant standard may be impossible if any
amount of uncertainty is present. In Section 5 we reconcile the dierence by
adding a dynamic aspect to the game|we make the assumption that once a
rm complies with a standard, others observe that and can begin to comply
as well. Under this assumption, for a small average compliance time (i.e.
as the expected compliance time goes to zero) the sequential-move game of
Farrell and Saloner (1985) is a valid approximation, and the Pareto ecient
outcome is an equilibrium. On the other hand, for a large average compliance
time (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to innity) the simultaneous-
move model considered herein is a valid approximation.
Therefore, average compliance time (or, equivalently, average time-to-
build) plays an important role in the adoption of standards. Pacheco-de-
Almeida and Zemsky (2003) nd that time-to-build also has a signicant
impact on investment timing and the tradeo between exibility and com-
mitment, rm heterogeneity, and the evolution of prices under demand un-
certainty.
9Finally, Section II of Farrell and Saloner (1986) presents a model related
to ours, where agents can switch from an old standard to a new one. Each
agent faces occasional switching opportunities, arriving randomly in an in-
dependent Poisson process. For some values of the costs and benets of the
standards (with or without other agents complying with them), agents do
not switch to the new standard even if they unanimously favor the switch,
because each prefers others to switch rst. This eect, however, is driven by
the technological infeasibility of the new standard in the absence of trans-
fers between agents|an agent who switches rst is in expectation worse o
than he would be if nobody switched. In our setup, in contrast, the eect is
driven by strategic considerations and the inability of agents to commit to
their compliance times. If noise is small (i.e. the rate of the Poisson process
is high), then in the setup of Farrell and Saloner (1986) technological frictions
vanish and ecient standard gets adopted, whereas in our setup commitment
problems remain and the result is unchanged.
3 The Model
We start with a simple model where complying with a standard is only prof-
itable if all other rms comply as well. This simple model is sucient to
illustrate the importance of noise in the process of standard adoption and
creation. In Section 6 we will consider a more general model of network ex-
ternalities. The key assumption of our model is that each rm can select the
10target time by which it expects to become compliant with a new standard.
The actual compliance time, however, is uncertain|it is equal to the tar-
get compliance time plus a disturbance term. The random disturbances are
uncorrelated across rms, and thus perfect coordination is impossible|some
rms are bound to comply earlier than others. While a rm is waiting for
others to comply, it bears waiting costs. It only gets benets after everyone
(or, in a more general model, a sucient number of other rms) complies.
More formally, suppose there are N rms that consider adopting a new
standard. Each rm can choose a target compliance time i  mi at which
it plans to comply with the standard (mi is an exogenous constraint|for
each rm there is some minimum time required to comply), or a rm can
choose not to comply at all, which we denote by out. All rms select their
target times simultaneously. If the rm decides not to comply, its payo is
0. Otherwise, its actual compliance time ti is equal to i plus a random dis-
turbance drawn from continuous probability distribution Fi independent of
other rms' disturbances. As soon as a rm complies with the new standard,
it has to pay a cost of supporting it of ci per period. When (and if!) all rms
adopt the standard, rm i starts getting a ow of net benets di (i.e. the
per-period gross benet is ci+di). The adoption time, i.e. the time when all
rms comply, is denoted by t = maxi ftig (if one of the agents never adopts,
we say that t = 1). For simplicity, we assume that ci and di do not change
over time. The rm's payo is a discounted ow of costs and benets from
the new standard: i = E[
R 1
ti ti(t)dt], where i(t) is the sum of cost and
11gross benet accrued at time t;
i(t) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 for t  ti
 ci for ti < t  t
di for t < t:
Assume that the discount factor, , is strictly less than 1. We will refer
to the game described above as  ():
To analyze the equilibria of  (), we construct an approximation with
no time discounting. To be able to do that, we renormalize payos, and
for each i subtract the net benet after universal adoption, di, from rm i's





> > > > <
> > > > :
 di for t  ti
 (ci + di) for ti < t  t
0 for t < t:
More precisely, dene  (1) as follows. Action space and probability dis-
tributions of disturbances are the same as before, but payos are dierent.
If a player chooses out, his payo is uout
7. If player i chooses some target
compliance time and another player chooses out, player i's payo is  1. If
all players choose to comply, the payo of player i is given by the expected
value of  ci (t   ti)   dit; where t = maxi ftig, and vector t is equal to
vector  plus random vector  of disturbances drawn from continuous prob-
7uout is assumed to be \suciently" low. The exact denition will be made clear in
the next section.




To summarize the notation:
fout;[mi;+1)g action space of rm i
i  mi target compliance time of rm i if it decides to comply
ti actual compliance time of rm i
i rm i's disturbance, ti   i
Fi distribution of i
ci per-period cost paid by rm i after it complies
di per-period net benet received by rm i after all rms comply
 time discount factor
uout in  (1), payo of a rm which decides not to comply
t maxi ftig; i.e. the adoption time
si support ratio of rm i; equals
ci
ci+di:
4 The Viability of a Standard
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium set of  () as  ! 1.
It gives a criterion of the viability of a standard, i.e. a necessary and sucient
condition for the existence of equilibrium where the standard is adopted
provided that players are suciently patient. If the sum of support ratios
of all players is less than one, a standard is viable. This condition does not
depend on the distribution of noise|it only depends on the rms' support
ratios. Also, it says that as  increases, equilibrium target compliance times
13decrease, i.e. as players become more patient, they adopt earlier.
Proposition 1 If
PN
i=1 si < 1, then
(i) there exists 0 < 1 such that for any 0 <  < 1 game  () has exactly
two equilibria|one in which all players choose to adopt, and one in which
all players choose not to adopt,8
(ii) lim
!1
() = (1), where () denotes the vector of target compliance
times in the equilibrium where the standard is adopted,
(iii) for any 0 < 1  2  1, (1)  (2).
(iv) If
PN
i=1 si > 1, then there exists 0
0 < 1 such that for any 0
0 <  < 1
game  () has only one equilibrium, and in that equilibrium all players choose
not to adopt.
We prove this proposition in two steps. Step 1 is to characterize the
equilibria of the game with no time discounting,  (1)|this is done in Propo-
sition 2. Step 2 is to show that equilibria of  () converge to those of  (1)
as  ! 1:
Step 1. First, we prove two auxiliary results.
Lemma 1 Suppose players have distributions of disturbances fFig. Take
any strictly positive numbers fpig such that
P
pi = 1. Then there exists a
vector of target times such that each player i adopts last with probability pi.
Proof. See Appendix.
8Remarkably, there are no mixed equilibria.
14Lemma 2 Suppose players have distributions of disturbances fFig. Take
any strictly positive numbers fpig such that
P
pi  1. Take any numbers
fmig. Then there exists a vector of target times, , such that (i) for all i,
i  mi, (ii) each player i adopts last with probability greater than or equal
to pi, and (iii) if i > mi, player i adopts last with probability exactly equal
to pi. If
P
pi < 1; such vector  is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we can state the necessary and sucient condition for the existence
of an equilibrium of  (1) where rms choose to adopt. Such equilibrium
exists if and only if the sum of the probabilities with which players want to
be last is less than or equal to one.
Proposition 2 For suciently low values of uout, game  (1) has a Nash
equilibrium where players choose to participate if and only if
N X
i=1
si  1; (1)
and when the above inequality is strict, such equilibrium is unique. Also,
there is only one other equilibrium|all players choose out.9
Proof. First, notice that if in an equilibrium at least one player plays
out with a positive probability, all of them have to play out with probability
1 (to get uout instead of  1). Therefore, \all out" is an equilibrium and
9In particular, this proposition implies that if benets are small relative to costs, e.g.
di = 0 for all i, there is only one equilibrium|all players choose out.
15in all other equilibria (if they exist) players have to mix among target times
and never play out.
Suppose player i takes the distribution of adoption times of other players
as given. Then, in his personal optimum, he will choose his adoption time
i in such a way that either i = mi and the probability of him being last
is qi  si or i > mi and the probability of him being last is qi = si. (To
see that, suppose that i > mi and the probability of him being last is
qi > ci=(ci + di): If instead he plans to adopt slightly earlier, at i   ; in
expectation he gains qidi + O(2) (when he is the last one to adopt) and
loses (1   qi)ci + O(2) (when he is not). For i to be optimal, it has to be
the case that qidi   (1   qi)ci = 0 =) qi = ci=(ci + di): Similar arguments
apply to the case qi < ci=(ci + di):)
If the sum of these \desired" probabilities si is greater than one, then,
since each player wants to adopt last with at least his \desired" probability,
no  can satisfy these conditions. When
P
si  1; by Lemma 2, such  exists
and hence it is an equilibrium provided that each player's expected payo
is greater than uout. When the inequality is strict, uniqueness also follows
directly from Lemma 2.
Step 2. The proof that equilibria of  () converge to those of  (1) as
 ! 1 is rather technical, and we present it in the Appendix. This completes
the proof of Proposition 1.
Note that it is clear from the proof that if inequality (1) is strict, then
in the equilibrium where the standard is adopted some rms comply as soon
16as they can, while for the rest the probability of being last is equal to the
support ratio.
An interesting question is what happens if we relax the assumption of
costs and benets being constant over time. The results change little if
costs are decreasing and benets are increasing in time|a standard can be
adopted if and only if the sum of limit support ratios is less than one. If,
however, costs and benets vary less regularly over time, increasing over some
intervals and decreasing over others, the criteria for adoptability become more
complicated.
5 The Observability of Compliance Times
In Section 4 we showed that in a wide range of cases a technically superior
standard may not be viable. This is the opposite of Farrell and Saloner
(1985) conclusion that if players make adoption decisions sequentially, then
a Pareto superior standard gets adopted in equilibrium. In this section we
reconcile the dierence by adding a dynamic aspect to the game|we make
an assumption that once a rm complies with a standard, others observe that
and can begin to comply as well. Proposition 3 shows that for small average
compliance times (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to zero) the
sequential-move game of Farrell and Saloner is a valid approximation, and
the Pareto ecient outcome is the only equilibrium. On the other hand, for
large average compliance times (i.e. as the expected compliance time goes to
17innity), the simultaneous-move model of Section 3 is a valid approximation
(Proposition 4), and therefore a Pareto optimal standard may be impossible
to implement.
Assume that at each time t a rm can initiate the compliance process if
it has not already done so. Once initiated, the process takes an uncertain
amount of time. Let Ti denote the expected amount of time it takes rm i to
comply; the actual compliance time (if the rm initiated the process at time t)
is thus t+Ti+i, where i is a random deviation. We assume that distributions
of random deviations are bounded for all players and independent of each
other. Dene Tmin = minifTi+ig and Tmax = maxifTi+ig, where i and i
are the lower and the upper bounds of stochastic deviations i of rm i. In
other words, Tmin is the shortest amount of time it takes any rm to comply,
and Tmax is the longest amount of time it takes any rm to comply once it
has initiated the compliance process. Once a rm has initiated the process,
it cannot reverse it or inuence the time it is going to take.
Each rm observes when others comply, i.e. at time t each rm knows
who has complied prior to time t and when they did it. However, it does not
know who has initiated the compliance process. We also assume that the
discount rate  < 1 is held constant. Then the following propositions hold.
Proposition 3 If the new standard is strictly Pareto optimal, then as Tmax !
0, equilibrium payos of the players approach the payos they would obtain
if each rm immediately decided to comply with the standard.10
10Notice that Tmax ! 0 implies that for each player both average compliance time and
18Proof. See Appendix.
Now consider a family of games with observable compliance times where
all players' expected initiation-to-compliance times Ti are increased by the
same x  0, while holding the distributions of disturbances the same. Notice
that without observable compliance times all these games are identical, up
to multiplying all players' payos by x, and thus we can without ambiguity
talk about the corresponding simultaneous-move game without observable
compliance times.
Proposition 4 As x ! 1, the game with observable compliance times has
an equilibrium where the standard is adopted if and only if there exists an




Up to this point we have assumed a very specic form of network externali-
ties. We now show how our results can be extended to network externalities
of a general form. We continue to assume that there are N players who
choose their target compliance times and whose actual compliance times are
independent stochastic deviations from their targets. We also assume that
the amount of noise go to zero.
19all players are identical. Firms bear per-period cost c after they comply. The
per-period net benet of a rm that has complied with the standard is now
d(k) (i.e. the gross benet is c + d(k)), where k is the number of rms that
have complied up to that moment, including itself; k 2 f1;2;:::;Ng. We
assume that d(N) > 0, i.e. the new standard is protable if everyone adopts
it, and that d(k) is weakly increasing in k.11
Then the following result holds.
Proposition 5 For suciently patient players, there exists an equilibrium





s(k) > 1; where s(k) =
c
c+d(k):12
Proof. We omit the approximation part of the proof, since it is com-
pletely analogous to Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 1, and we go directly
to the case with no discounting. Notice that since players are identical, in the
equilibrium where they comply they have to target the same time. Therefore,
for a given rm, its probability of being the kth rm to comply is equal to 1
N
for any k. Therefore, its expected net benet from delaying its compliance
by a small amount of time is proportional to c   1
N
P
k(c + d(k)), which is











s(k) = 1. Then in the game
with no discounting players do not want to deviate if all target the same
11This assumption says that externalities from technology adoption are positive. Fuden-
berg and Tirole (1985, 1986) study the timing of technology adoption under the opposite
conditions, where players impose negative externalities on each other.
12Of course, s(k) can be greater than one, since d(k) is the net benet and can be
negative.
20compliance times. In the presence of any nontrivial discounting, however, a
player's higher benets are discounted at a higher rate, since they on average
happen when he complies later, and therefore he would be strictly better o
by deviating by a small amount.
The proposition states that a standard can be adopted in equilibrium






than one. From symmetry, it follows that in equilibrium each player has the
same probability of complying rst, last, or anything in between. Thus, the
condition simply states that in expectation, the ow of benets at the time
of compliance is greater than the ow of costs of maintaining a standard. If
that were false, a player would prefer to comply later.
The following corollary of Proposition 5 reects the fact that the free
rider problem does not become more severe if the number of players in the
standard adoption game is increased.13
Corollary 1 Consider two games with dierent numbers of players but iden-
tical costs c and identical network externalities d(k). If a standard can be
adopted in an equilibrium of a game that has N players, then it can be adopted
in a game that has more than N players.
Throughout the paper we refer to players as rms, because the results
of Section 4 are relevant for standard adoption games where the number
13Suppose that in the game with N players a new standard is viable. Then if one
more player is added to the game, each player would like to target a compliance time
that is earlier or the same as in the N player game. Also, if one of the players changes
his compliance time to an earlier date, none of the players would want to increase their
compliance times.
21of participants is small and each participant may be pivotal (players are a
handful of corporations). The results of the present section are also relevant
for standards that can only succeed if adopted by millions of consumers or
other small players, even though there is no longer any uncertainty about
the share of players who have complied at any given moment. The following
corollary makes this claim formal. Assume that there is a continuum of
identical players. Let D() denote the per-period net benet to a player
who is compliant with the new standard at the time when share  of the
population of players is compliant; as before, the support ratio is S() =
c
c+D():
Corollary 2 For suciently patient players, there exists an equilibrium where





7 Overcoming Coordination Failure
Just like the presence of adverse selection does not necessarily imply that
markets collapse, synchronization problems do not necessarily imply that
standards will not be adopted. Rather, institutions may arise to overcome
these failures, and understanding the problems helps us better understand
the institutions.
The most straightforward way to overcome synchronization failure is to
write enforceable contracts, specifying penalties for late compliance. Ostro-
vsky and Schwarz (2002) characterize the socially optimal target compliance
22times and present incentive mechanisms that would induce players to tar-
get these times in equilibrium. In practice, however, compliance times may
be noncontractible. Partially enforceable contracts may go a long way to-
wards overcoming the synchronization failure, and guring out what kinds
of enforceability are sucient is an interesting area for future research.
Another way to achieve coordination is to \discretize" time and thus
eliminate the possibility of being \slightly late." Perhaps unintentionally,
annual industry trade shows may accomplish that. A trade show provides
wide exposure to new products, and missing one may result in a year of
lost prots from the new standard. Sometimes, discretization is natural|
Christmas only comes once a year, and that's when many consumer goods
manufacturers sell most of their merchandize. A videogame producer cannot
aord to be slightly late with the new release for a game console.
It may also be easier to adopt a standard if the compliance process is
gradual, with a rm's costs and benets increasing as its degree of compli-
ance, e.g. the number of compliant products, goes up. Alternatively, it may
help if the intermediate stages of the rm's compliance process are observ-
able to outsiders|for example, a beta-version of a software package may
serve as such a signal. Also, when representatives of interested parties work
together on specifying and improving a standard, constant communication
allows the tracking of other rms' progress and thus helps alleviate synchro-
nization issues. This is, in fact, how Internet standards are developed by
23the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).14 The consortium includes more
than 500 entities: all major software rms, many universities, publishers,
and even the Library of Congress. When a need for a new standard is iden-
tied (e.g. MathML|a way of displaying mathematical equations on web
pages, XML Query|a way of eciently exchanging data between web pages
and databases, and so on), a working group of interested parties' engineers
is created to develop the standard. These engineers communicate with each
other as they work out technical specications and documentation, and also
work with their rms' developers on implementing the standards. Thus, by
the time a version of the standard is nalized and publicly released, there is
already a critical mass of adopters.
Assuming costs and benets add up when rms merge, the support ratio
of a merged rm is lower than the sum of support ratios of its components.
Thus, mergers reduce the sum of support ratios of market participants and
help make standards viable. Once the standard is adopted, we may see
spinos. This prediction sounds far-fetched, but this is in fact what happens
quite often in large-scale real estate projects, when a single developer builds
up a piece of land and then sells or leases the parts o. Celebration, Florida15
and Santana Row in San Jose, California16 are just two recent examples of
towns built by a single developer from scratch. Residential and commercial





Our results imply some interesting corollaries. First, they say that a Pareto
improving standard is not necessarily viable. The following quotation from
the Court's Findings of Fact in the U.S. v. Microsfot case gives a very similar
argument:
41. In deciding whether to develop an application for a new
operating system, an [Independent Software Vendor's] rst con-
sideration is the number of users it expects the operating system
to attract. Out of this focus arises a collective-action problem:
Each ISV realizes that the new operating system could attract a
signicant number of users if enough ISVs developed applications
for it; but few ISVs want to sink resources into developing for the
system until it becomes established. Since everyone is waiting for
everyone else to bear the risk of early adoption, the new operating
system has diculty attracting enough applications to generate
a positive feedback loop.17
Another setting where our results apply is the creation of standards by
various industry groups. We can view this process as a two-stage game.
17The document goes on to say that \the vendor of a new operating system cannot
eectively solve this problem by paying the necessary number of ISVs to write for its
operating system, because the cost of doing so would dwarf the expected return." We
disagree with this claim|in our opinion, the reason for the operating system vendor's
inability to pay the ISVs has to do with complications inherent in writing and enforcing
the necessary contracts.
25First, an industry consortium develops and recommends a single standard
out of a large universe of technically feasible standards. Then each player
decides if and when to adopt a standard recommendation. The subgame is
modeled as a standard adoption game considered earlier. The objective of
the consortium is to select a Pareto improving standard that maximizes the
total payo of the industry participants.18 This objective implies that the
consortium will always choose to recommend a viable standard, whenever
a viable standard is available. Thus, the equilibrium recommendation of
the consortium may be Pareto dominated by some technologically feasible
standard.
A disclaimer is in order: it is not our contention that noise in adoption
terms determines the outcome of a battle among competing standards. How-
ever, looking at support ratios may oer an insight into competition among
standards: for a standard to survive and be backed by some coalition of
players it has to be the case that its support ratios are suciently low.
18Nothing would change if the objective function of the consortium were to maximize
some objective function that is increasing in the prot of each player.
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29A Proofs of Section 4 Lemmas
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let f() =
P
jqi   pij, where  is a vector of target compliance times and
qi is the probability that player i complies last. Take  which minimizes
f. Suppose f() > 0. Then there exists i such that q
i > pi. Reduce
i slightly (call the new vector 0) so that the new q0













Notice that for all j 6= i, q0
j  q
j and for at least one j, pj  q0
j. Hence,






jj = f(). Contradiction.
Notice that we assumed that the minimizing  exists. When all distri-
butions are bounded, this assumption is justied by the fact that we can
restrict  to, say, a set of vectors in which 1 = 0 and all other j are
bounded by the sum of the sizes of supports of all N distributions of dis-
turbances. When some distributions are not bounded, we make use of our
assumption that all pi are positive. We can choose  > 0, 2 < min(pi)
and approximate unbounded distributions by bounded ones so that for all
 the dierence between f() for the unbounded distributions and their
bounded approximations is less than . Then there exists  such that
fbounded approximation() = 0, and then argminf() exists and belongs to the
compact set fj1 = 0; fbounded approximation()  2g:
30A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider set T = fj8i;i  mi;qi()  pig; where qi() is the probability
that player i complies last given that players choose target times . Take
 2 T which minimizes
P
i i in T. Then  satises the conditions of the
lemma. Indeed, for all i, qi  pi, and we only need to show that for all i
i > mi implies qi = pi. Suppose that is not so. Take i such that qi > pi and
i > mi. We can slightly decrease i so that it is still greater than mi and
qi is still greater than pi, i.e. the modied  is still in T. But we decreased
P
i i|contradiction!
Of course, it is necessary to prove that such minimizing  exists. To show
that, rst notice that set T is not empty as, according to Lemma 1, there
exists  such that q1() = 1   p2      pN and qi() = pi for i > 1.






i g. The latter set is compact, the former is closed,
and so their intersection is compact and, since function
P
i is continuous
in , there exist  in that set which minimizes this function.
When
P
pi < 1; such vector has to be unique: if there are two vectors
(1;2) satisfying the conditions, take player i with the biggest increase in
i from 1 to 2; then both qi(2) > pi and 2
i > mi|contradiction.
B Proof of Proposition 1|Step 2
For simplicity, assume that distributions of disturbances Fi are bounded.
31(i) Clearly, the strategy vector where nobody complies is an equilibrium.
Let's show that for  suciently close to 1, there exists exactly one other
pure equilibrium, and no mixed ones. The proof is similar to the proof of
Lemma 2.
Take a Nash Equilibrium in which player i chooses compliance time i
with positive probability. For convenience, if player j chooses not to comply,
let tj = 1 and tj > ti. By the same \marginal delay" reasoning as in









tiProb(i = lastjti)fi(ti   i)dti









tiProb(i = lastjti)fi(ti   i)dti
if i = mi.
By adding ci
R 1










tiProb(ti  tj8jjti)fi(ti   i)dti









tiProb(ti  tj8jjti)fi(ti   i)dti
32if i = mi.
Crucially, the ratio of the right-hand side over the left-hand side goes
up if i goes up, unless all other players choose not to comply, and so one
and only one point on the real line can satisfy this condition. This rules out
mixing among compliance times.
Let ^ qi(;) be equal to
R 1
 1 tiProb(ti  tj8jjti)fi(ti   i)dti R 1
 1 tifi(ti   i)dti
:
Consider set T() = fj8ii  mi; ^ qi(;) 
ci
ci+dig. It follows from Lemma 2
that there exists 1  m such that qi(1) = ^ qi(;1) = Prob(ti  tj8jj1) >
ci
ci+di: lim!1 ^ qi(1;) = qi(1), and so there exists 0 such that 8 > 0 we
have ^ qi(1;) >
ci
ci+di. Thus, T() is nonempty. Take  2 T which min-
imizes
P
i i. It satises the FOC above and is a Nash Equilibrium. Let's
show that there are no other equilibria.
First, let's show that there is no mixing between complying and not
complying. Suppose player i is indierent between the two, and his opti-
mal compliance time is i.
R 1
t d = (1=ln)t. Thus, 0 = 0ln =
lnE[ ci(
R 1
ti d) + (ci + di)(
R 1
tlast d)] =  ciE[ti] + (ci + di)E[tlast].
But (ci +di)E[tlast] = (ci +di)E[tiProb(i = last)+tlastProb(i 6= last)] >
(ci+di)E[tiProb(i = last)]  (by FOC) ciE[ti]|contradiction. Therefore,
there are no mixed equilibria.
The proof that there can not be two equilibrium compliance time vectors
331;2 is the same as before|if there are, take player i with the biggest
increase in i from 1 to 2; then both ^ qi(;) > ci=(ci +di) and 2
i > mi|
contradiction.
(ii) Suppose () does not go to (1) as  goes to 1. Then there exists
a subsequence fng converging to 1 such that (n) converges to some
~  6= (1) (set of () is bounded as  ! 1). Then by continuity, ~  satises
the FOC with  = 1 and is therefore an equilibrium of game  (1). But we
know that  (1) has only one equilibrium with compliance, equal to (1).
(iii) Take 1 < 2, and suppose for some i, 1 = 
i(1) < 2 = 
i(2).












1 f(ti   1)dti:













1 ((ci + di)Prob(ti = last)   ci)f(ti   2)dti > 0:
Let t
i be such that (ci+di)Prob(t
i = last) ci = 0. The integrand is negative
for ti < t
i and positive for ti > t


















1 ((ci + di)Prob(ti = last)   ci)f(ti   2)dti > 0:
But this, together with 2 > 1  mi, is a violation of the FOC for an
equilibrium.
(iv) To prove the last statement, assume the opposite. Then there is a
sequence fng converging to 1 from above such that for each n there is
an equilibrium where players choose to comply. Then there is a subsequence
fkg such that (k) converges to some ~ . But then by continuity, ~  satises
the FOC with  = 1 and is therefore an equilibrium of game  (1). But we
know that  (1) does not have an equilibrium where players comply.
C Proofs of Section 5 Propositions
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3
We prove the statement by induction on N, the number of players. For N = 1
the statement is obvious. Suppose it holds for N = k, let's show that it also
holds for N = k+1. Suppose there is a sequence of equilibria for Tmax ! 0 in
which the payos of players converge to something other than the payos of
the Pareto-ecient outcome (i.e. the immediate adoption of the standard).
35Take any player i whose equilibrium payo in the limit is strictly less than
his payo under the immediate adoption. If he deviates from his equilibrium
strategy, and initiates the compliance process immediately, then others will
observe that he has complied at most after Tmax. After that we are back in
the game with N   1 players, which, by the assumption of induction, has
equilibria payos arbitrarily close to Pareto optimal ones as Tmax goes to 0.
But then player i's payo from deviating is less than the Pareto payo by at
most the costs and foregone prots up to Tmax plus the costs and foregone
prots while the (N   1)-player subgame takes place. But each of these
two components goes to zero as Tmax goes to zero, and so player i's payo
from deviating goes to his Pareto payo|thus any equilibrium payo has to
approach the Pareto payo as well.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose the simultaneous-move game has an equilibrium where the standard
is adopted. Let x be such that minifTi + x + ig is greater than maxifTi +
ig. Then the equilibrium with adoption of the simultaneous-move game
remains an equilibrium of the game with observable compliance time, since
the optimal target compliance times are such that players want to initiate the
compliance process before they could have possibly observed other players'
compliance.
On the other hand, suppose the simultaneous-move game does not have
an equilibrium where the standard is adopted, but for arbitrarily large x the
36game with observable compliance times does. Notice that in an equilibrium
with adoption, for a large enough x, each player (say, player 1) has to initiate
the compliance process before observing others comply with a positive prob-
ability (otherwise the payo of at least one of the other players is negative, as
player 1 always complies too late). Let i(x) denote the earliest target com-
pliance time of player i in an equilibrium with delay x; subtract 1(x) from
all i(x)s to normalize. Now consider the sequence of vectors (x) as x goes
to innity. This sequence has to be bounded|otherwise the player with the
lowest i(x) would nd it protable to deviate and not comply at all. Thus,
it has to converge to some vector . By assumption, there were no equilibria
with compliance in the simultaneous-move game, and thus there is at least
one player who would nd it strictly protable to slightly increase his target
compliance time if everyone targeted . But then, for a large enough x, this
player would also nd it protable to do that in the observable-compliance
game with delay x.
D Robustness to Noise
Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2002) show that in global games, dierent
equilibria may be pinned down by vanishingly small noise. They also show
that a sucient condition for an equilibrium in a global game to be robust
to the structure of noise is to be a weighted potential maximizer, provided
that the payos are own-action quasiconcave. These concepts are dened in
37Section 6 of FMP as follows.
Denition A complete information game g is own-action quasiconcave if
for all i and opposing action proles a i 2 A i and for all constants c, the
set fai : gi(ai;a i)  cg is convex.
Denition Action prole a is a weighted potential maximizer (WP-maximizer)
of g if there exists a vector  2 RI
+ and a weighted potential function v : A !
R with v(a) > v(a) for all a 6= a, such that for all i, ai, a0




i;a i) = i[gi(ai;a i)   gi(a
0
i;a i)]:
The results of Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2002) have parallels in our
setting. Namely, the games presented herein indeed have weighted potential
maximizers, and are own-action quasiconcave. On the other hand, changing
our setting in such a way that the game no longer has a potential leads to
the dependence of equilibrium on the structure of noise.
We focus our attention on the case with no discounting; the results do
not change if we consider  < 1, but presentation gets more complicated.
38D.1 Potentiality of \Noiseless"  (1)
Consider a \noiseless" version of game  (1), where ti = i.
i(ti) =  ci(t   ti)   dit

0
i(ti) = ci   (ci + di)(player i is last);
and therefore payos i are own-action quasiconcave.
To show that this is also a weighted potential game, let v(t) =
P
siti t;










[citi   (ci + di)t]   [cit0
i   (ci + di)t0
]
ci + di
= i (i(ti;t i)   i(t
0
i;t i)):
Thus, v(t) = [
P
siti   t] is a weighted potential function of \noiseless"
 (1). If
P
si < 1, this function is maximized at a certain value of t (since we
assume that target arrival times are bounded from below), and \noisy"  (1)
has a unique equilibrium with adoption. When
P
si > 1; v is unbounded
(adding the same constant  to all ti increases v by (
P
si   1)), and  (1)
has no equilibrium with adoption. When
P
si = 1; there is a continuum of
values of t maximizing function v (since adding the same constant to all target
arrival times ti leaves function v unchanged), and  (1) has a continuum of
equilibria with adoption.
39D.2 Potentiality of the Adoption Game with Gradual
Network Externalities and Identical Players
We now show that the game with identical players and gradual network
externalities considered in Section 6 also has a potential function (the proof
of its own-action quasiconcavity is very similar to the proof of  (1)'s own-
action quasiconcavity, and is thus omitted). Namely, let v(t) =  [d(1)t1 +
d(2)t2 ++d(N)tN]; where t1 is the actual compliance time of the earliest




=  d(1)(player i is rst)
 d(2)(player i is second)
 
 d(N)(player i is last):
On the other hand, the expected net benet of player i from delaying
his compliance time by an innitesimal amount of time,
@Pii
@ti ; is also equal to
 d(1)(player i is rst) d(2)(player i is second)  d(N)(player i is last);
and so v(ti;t i) v(t0
i;t i) = i(ti;t i) i(t0
i;t i): Therefore, v is a potential
function of the game with gradual network externalities and identical players.
Just like in the game  (1); one can verify that this potential function has
a (unique) maximizer if and only if the corresponding game has a (unique)
40equilibrium where players adopt the standard.
D.3 The Game with Gradual Network Externalities
and Dierent Players
A general game with gradual network externalities and dierent players no
longer has a weighted potential function (this can be checked by comparing
cross-derivatives
@i
@j), and so we do not necessarily expect equilibria to be
robust to the form of noise. Indeed, the following counterexample presents a
game with gradual network externalities and dierent payos, in which the
existence of equilibrium depends on the structure of noise.
There are three players. The net payo of player i when he arrives kth is
equal to di(k), given in the table below.
i n k 1 2 3
1 -1 0 1
2 -1 0 1
3 -1 -1 2
In the rst case, suppose that each player's noise is distributed uniformly
on [0;]. Then it is an equilibrium for all players to target the same ar-
rival time|the expected marginal benet from deviating by an innitesi-
mal amount (we will call this \the expected rst-day payo") is zero for
each player (proportional to ( 1 + 0 + 1)=3 = 0 for players 1 and 2 and to
( 1   1 + 2)=3 = 0 for player 3).
41In the second case, consider the following form of noise. Players 1 and 2
either arrive very early ([0;]), or very late ([100;101]), with equal proba-
bilities. Player 3's noise, on the other hand, is still uniform on [0;]. Then
this game has no equilibrium.
Indeed, suppose there is an equilibrium. It has to be in pure strategies,
since, holding other players' strategies constant, a player's expected payo is
concave in his target arrival time. If players 1 and 2 target the same com-
pliance time, pick any one of them; otherwise, pick the one who targets the
earlier time. Without loss of generality, assume player 1 is picked. Normalize
his earliest possible arrival compliance time to 0. Then it cannot be the case
that player 3 ever arrives later than 100 (because that would imply that
player 3's target compliance time is greater than 99 and he never arrives
before . That, in turn, would imply that player 1 arrives rst more often
than he arrives last, making his expected rst-day payo negative, which is
impossible in equilibrium). Thus, player 3 always arrives before time 100.
Therefore, for him to be the last one it has to be the case that both players 1
and 2 comply in the earlier of the two intervals, which happens with probabil-
ity .25. But then player 3's rst-day payo is no more than :252 :751 < 0;
which is impossible in equilibrium.
42